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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARDS FOR
INJURIES TO SPECIFIC MEMBERS OF THE BODY
SIDNEY SHEMEL
Attorneys engaged in practice before workmen's compensation tribunals
are frequently confronted with the problem of whether claimants with in-
juries to specific members of the body should receive schedule awards, or
awards for reduced earning capacity. Schedule awards are ostensibly sup-
posed to be granted for such injuries; yet non-schedule compensation is
often allowed.
Why is it important to distinguish between schedule and non-schedule
injuries? What criteria are applied to determine whether an injury deserves
an award for reduced earning capacity rather than a schedule award? What
injuries to specific members generally call for awards, for reduced earning
capacity as contrasted with schedule awards? In the discussion which fol-
lows, these problems are considered, primarily in terms of New York de-
cisions, but with a necessary background of the adjudications of other
tribunals.
Under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law1 special provision
is made to compensate claimants with permanent or temporary total dis-
ability.2 Whether there is a permanent total disability is to be determined
"in accordance with the facts." 3 It is immaterial that the disability is due to
an injury such as the loss of a leg, which is scheduled by the Workmen's
Compensation Law. If the resultant disability be total, an award is granted
for total disability.4 In this respect, New York differs from many other
I"Whether an injury shall be classified as a specific injury or as a permanent partial
or total disability depends much upon the particular wording of the Workmen's Compen-
sation statute." Note (1936) 22 IowA L. REv. 161.2N. Y. Wom. Com P. L. § 15 (1) (2).
3 N. Y. WORK. Comp., L. § 15 (1) states: "Loss of both hands, or both arms, or both
feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof shall, in the absence of conclusive
proof to the contrary, constitute permanent total disability.. In all other cases permanent
total disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts."
It has been said that the "most liberal type of statute provides for a determination
of a case in accordance with the facts. Under such a clause a finding of the Industrial
Commissioner of total disability will not be disturbed, even though the injury be one
for which the specific schedule might have provided compensation." Note (1936) 22
IOWA L. Rav. 161.4 Carr v. Lewiston Union School, 241 App. Div. 640, 13 IND. BULL. 26 (3d Dep't 1934)
(an ununited fracture of the femur was the basis of an award for permanent total dis-
ability); Matter of Cartenuto v. McConnell & Company, Inc., 254 App. Div. 612, 2 N. Y.
S. (2d) 841 (3d Dep't 1938), leave to appeal denied 278 N. Y. 737 (1938), 204 SPEC.
BULL. 277 (open ulcers on heel of foot, chronic osteomyelitis and a circulatory disturbance
of foot; permanent total disability found).
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states wherein a schedule injury merits only scheduled compensation re-
gardless of its effect upon a claimant's ability to work.5
Schedule awards and awards for reduced earning capacity are provided
for under Subdivision 3 of Section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Law
which is entitled "Permanent partial disability." Schedules for the loss or
loss of use of members of the ,body are set forth in Paragraphs a through 1.
Provision for non-scheduled compensation in "all other cases" is made in
Paragraph v.
I., ENUMERATED AND UNENUIMERATED SCHEDULE AWARDS
Cases of permanent partial -disability are thus 'divided into two classes.,
(1) enumerated injuries to members of the body for which statutory fixed
awards are provided; (2) unenumerated "other cases."
The schedule lists specific awards for the loss or loss of use of arms, legs,
hands, feet, eyes, fingers and phalanges. Compensation for loss of hearing
is also scheduled. The enumerated cases seem limited to the limbs, the eyes,
the hearing and to facial or head disfigurement. The unenumerated cases,
by elimination, would seem to include injuries: (1) confined to the trunk
and head, excluding injuries to the eyes, the hearing and disfigurement of
the face or head; (2) affecting the trunk or head concurrently with in-
juries affecting the limbs, eyes, hearing mechanism or causing disfigurement
of the face or head.7
How are the awards to be fixed for the enumerated schedule cases? It is
provided in Section 15, Subdivision 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Law
that:
... the compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of
the average weekly wages and shall be paid to the employee for the period
named in this subdivision....
The period of payment is set forth in a schedule listing the number of
5Note (1936) 22 IOWA L. REV. 161; Ketchikan Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Walker, 15
F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Cresson Co. v. Industrial Commission, 90 Colo. 353,
9 P. (2d) 295 (1932) ; Bateman v. Smith, 85 N. J. L. 409, 89 Atl. 979 (1914) ; Texas
Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Thrash, 136 S .W. (2d) 905 (Tek. Civ. App. 1940); Soukup
v. Shores Co., 222 Iowa 272, 268 N. W. 598 (1936) ; Stapf v. Savin, 125 Conn. 563, 7A.(2d) 226 (1939); O'Donnell v. South Lafayette T. P. School District, 109 Pa. Super.
163, 167 Atl. 48 (1932); Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 62 P. (2d) 920
(1936) ; Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, 161 Tenn, 470, 33 S. W. (2d) 90 (1930).
GFor a discussion of the schedule and "other cases" provisions see Matter of Flicker
v. Mac Sign Co., 252 N. Y. 492, 170 N. E. 118 (1930); Matter of Sokolowski v. Bank
of America, 261 N. Y. 57, 184 N. E. 492 (1933) ; and text infra, pp. 222.
7161 Ss'ac. BuLu. 107, 108 (N. Y. 1929).
1944]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
weeks of compensation to be paid for particular members of the body which
have been lost. For example, the loss of an arm entitles a claimant to 312
weeks of compensation, and the loss of a leg to 288 weeks of compensation.8
Often, however, there is only a -partial loss of the function of a member.
Must compensation be paid for the same period as that provided for the entire
loss of a member? According to the statute, the compensation period is to be
proportioned to the loss or loss of use of the member.9 Thus, if there is a
10% loss of function of a leg (the schedule lists 288 weeks for the entire
loss of a leg), the claimant recovers 10% of 288 weeks, 28.8 weeks, which is
multiplied by his compensation rate to determine the sum to be awarded.
How is the award fixed for non-enumerated "other cases"? The statute
provides that the compensation
shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the difference
between his average weekly wages and his wage-earning capacity there-
after in the same employment, or otherwise, payable during the con-
tinuance of such partial disability .... 10
Thus, if a man earned $35 a week before an accident and $50 a week
thereafter, under the above provision he would be entitled to two-thirds of
the difference, that is, two-thirds of $15,-or $10, payable during the con-
tinuance of his disability. The manner in which earning capacity is fixed has
been discussed by the writer in another article."
Schedtle awards are made irrespective of a claimant's return to work,
,the claimant receiving both his wages and the schedule payments.12
In New York the schedule establishes arbitrary periods of payment de-
signed to compensate claimants for the time they are "actually or presump-
tively . . . disabled and non-productive."' 3 Compensation is granted for in-
8N. Y. WORK. Cotp. L. § 15 (3) (a) (b).
9N. Y. WORK. Comr. L. § 15 (3) (s).
'ON. Y. WORK. ComP. L. § 15 (3) (v).
"lShemel, The Determination of Earning Capacity in Workmen's Compensation
Cases, 103 N. Y. L. J., p. 1856, col. 1, p. 1847, col. 1 (April 24, 25, 1940).
12Bednar v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 279 N. Y. 80, 17 N. E. (2d) 777, 17 IND. BULL. 580(1938); Rowe v. McGovern, 254 App. Div. 432, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 626, 17 IND. BULL.
347 (1938) ; 114 SpEc. BULL. 29 (1922) ; Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Pierson, 135
S., W. (2d) 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Morrow v. James S. Murray & Sons, 136 Pa.
277, 7 A. (2d) 109 (1939); Blue Bell Mfg. Co. v. Baird, 64 Ga. App. 347, 13 S. E.
(2d) 105 (1941).
13Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N. Y. 543, 546, 116 N. E. 379 (1917) ; Matter of Caro-
lan v. Hoe & Co., 225 App. Div. 393, 233 N. Y. Supp. 333 (3d Dep'tf 1939) ; Matter of
Bernstein v. Hoffman, 219 App. Div. 152, 154, 219 N. Y. Supp. 219 (3d Dep't 1927).
For a similar theory see Moses v. National Union Coal Mining Co., 194 Iowa 819,
184, N. W. 746 (1921).
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ability to work and not as an indemnity for physical impairment or the loss
of a member.1 4
The advantages of simplicity and definiteness afforded by a schedule are
considered by the New York courts as outweighing the disadvantage arising'
from the fact that actual periods of disability may be longer or shorter than
the schedule periods. 15
Before making awards for reduced earning capacity there must neces-
sarily be a determination of that reduced capacity.' 6 If a claimant, after
his injury, earns the same or more wages than he earned at the time of his
accident, there is no loss of earning capacity; consequently, no award for
reduced earning capacity can be made against the insurance carrier. If he
earns less than before the accident, awards for reduced earning capacity
will be allowed.
Ordinarily, insurance carriers favor schedule awards, since by such
awards their liability is limited to a specific number of weeks, and the pos-
sibility that they will be required to pay compensation to a claimant for the
remainder of his life is eliminated.17 Claimants who are unemployed or who
work for reduced wages usfially prefer awards for reduced earning capacity.
By such awards they are compensated during the period that their injuries
incapacitate them from earning their normal wages.' S Claimants receiving
their normal wages will geneially prefer schedule awards since such awards
permit them to collect wages and compensation at the same time.
II. NON-ScHEDULE AWARDS
In some cases, although claimants have injured specific members for which
injuries schedule awards are apparently provided, awards for reduced earning
capacity have been made. These awards seem, on their face, to be in viola-
tion of the statute. Yet, they have been sanctioned by the courts. What is
the basis for such sanction?
14 See cases cited note 13 supra.5i'Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N. Y. 543, 548, 116 N. E. 379, 380 (1917).
'
6 N. Y. WORK. CoMiP. L. § 15 (5) (a) ; Shemel, loc. cit. supra note 11; Elk City
Cotton Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 184 Okla. 503, 88 P. (2d) 615 (1939)
Panico v. Sperry Engineering Co., 113 Conn. 707, 156 At. 802 (1931).
17MARGOLIES AND BLOOm, A GuIDE TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1939) 70 states:
"Non-schedule cases are much more severe apd are more costly than the scheduled per-
manent impairments. For non-schedule cases, the average compensation per case re-
c eived by claimants for 1938 was $10,184. The average payment for scheduled injuries
was as follows: For eye (partial loss of vision) $1,727; for arm $1,478; for hand and
finger $474; for leg, foot and toe $748; and for loss of hearing $689."
'8N. Y. WORK. Coip. L. §§ 15 (3) (v) and (5) (a). It is provided by Subd. 5 (a)
that "the wage earning capacity of an injured employee in cases of partial disability shall
be determined by his actual earnings ......
19441
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Frequently, schedule and non-schedule injuries occur simultaneously. A
claimant may hurt his leg and back at the same time. In such a situation,
the courts have ruled consistently that there should be an award for reduced
earning capacity under the "other cases" clause.19 The reason for the re-
fusal to permit both schedule awards and reduced earning capacity awards
is that compensation for reduced earning capacity under the "other cases"
provision is considered to be complete and adequate in itself.20 Schedule and
"other cases" clauses are deemed to be mutually exclusive.21 In Matter of
Sokolowski v. Bank of America,22 the court said:
Obviously, the phrase "in all other cases" signifies that the provisions
of the paragraph shall apply only in cases where the injuries received are
not confined to a specific member or specific members. By clear implica-
tion if the schedules are sufficient completely to cover the disabilities,
paragraph v [the "other cases" paragraph] may not be employed to
extend the period of weeks provided for thereby.
Thus it would appear that where there are schedule injuries, schedule
awards must be granted for any resultant permanent partial disability. How-
ever, the courts, despite the clear wording of the Sokolowski case, have re-
peatedly sanctioned awards for reduced earning capacity in certain cases
where there seem to be schedule injuries to specific limbs.
The rule has been established that if an injury to a member results in a
permanent condition of "pain which affects claimant's general earning
capacity" an award for reduced earning capacity under the "other cases"
paragraph is proper.23 Why should such cases-be classified as non-schedule
19Schaefer v. Buffalo Steel Car Co., 225 App. Div. 839; 232 N. Y. Supp. 870 (3d
Dep't 1929), aff'd 250 N. Y. 507, 166 N. E. 183 (1929) ; Matter of Carolan v. Hoe &
Co., 225 App. Div. 393, 233 N. Y. Supp. 333 (3d Dep't 19 9) ; Dewitt v. Hoornbeek's
Sons, 248 App. Div. 647, 287 N. Y. Supp. 942, 204 SPEC. BULL. 289, 15 INn. BULL. 182
(3d Dep't 1936); Doherty v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 244 App. Div. 853, 279 N. Y.
Supp. 877, 14 IND. BULL. 172 (3d Dep't 1935) ; Neu v. General Electric Co., 243 App.
Div. 658, 14 IND. BULL. 29, 185 SPEc. BULL. 55 (3d Dep't 1935).20Pinski v. Superior Fireproof Door & Sash Co., 209 App. Div. 305, 204 N. Y. Supp.
415 (3d Dep't 1924).21Ibid.; Matter of Sokolowski v. Bank of America, 261 N. Y. 57, 62, 184 N. E. 492,
494 (1933) ; Freeland v. Endicott Forging & Mfg. Co., 233 App. Div. 440, 253 N. Y.
Supp. 597 (3d Dep't 1931).
22261 N. Y. 27, 62, 184 N. E. 492, 494 (1933) ; Freeland v. Endicott Forging & Mfg.
Co., 233 App. Div. 440, 253 N. Y. Supp. 597 (3d Dep't 1931) ; 71 C. J. 834.23Matter of Robinson v. Pitkin Moving 'Van Co., Inc., 258 App. Div. 829, 15 N. Y. S.
,(2d) 764, 204 SpEc. BULL. 285 (3d Ddp't 1938) ; Mestler v. American Book Sales Co.,
248 App. Div. 646, 287 N. Y. Supp. 512 (3d Dep't 1936), aff'd 272 N. Y. 544, 4 N. E.
(9d) 728, 204 Sl, c.. BULL. 284, 285 (1936) ; Matter of Cartenuto v. McDonnell & Co.,
Inc., 254 App. Div. 612, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 841 (3d Dep't 1939); DiBenedetto v. Mc-
Kinney Corp., 252 App. Div. 712, 298 N. Y. Supp. 810, 16 IND. BULL. 423, 204 SPEC. BULL.
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permanent partial disabilities? The statute dearly makes no provision for
pain, nor does it imply that pain takes a case out of the schedule group. 24
Furthermore, practice before the State Industrial Board reveals that "pain
which affects claimant's general earning capacity" is not always present in,
cases of injuries to specific members of the body wherein non-schedule
awards are made. Such awards are found in cases of unhealed non-painful
lesions such as leg ulcers. 2 5 Why are these cases classified as non-schedule
disabilities? As in the pain ,cases, no statute appears to except them from the
schedule group.
In the pain cases, only one decision has been found which has alluded' to a
reason why such cases are excluded from the schedule provisions. In that
case, an injury to the claimant's left knee aggravated a latent arthritis which
became severely painful and progressive. After a schedule award had been
made for 15%o loss of use of the leg, and the insurance carrier had paid the
award, the case was reopened. The schedule award. was rescinded and -an
award was granted for total temporary disability from the date of the acci-
dent up to the time when claimant first had an earning capacity and for re-
duced earning capacity after that time, the carrier being credited for schedule
payments made. The court, affirming the award, said:
The findings are to the effect that claimant's disability is not confined
to the left leg, but that it is coupled with additional disability due to
pain from arthritis. 2 6
Manifestly, all cases in which schedule awards are granted are character-
ized by impairment of a bodily function, such impairment causing a permanent
pArtial disability. To speak of an "additional disability" would be to refer to
a disability greater than one ordinarily resulting from schedule injuries.
If the criterion of exceptions to the schedule is "additional disability,"
clearly such exceptions need not be confined to cases of pain affecting earn-
ing capacity, but may also encompass the non-painful unhealed lesion and
other cases.
The New York Court of Appeals has established the real, over-all
criterion for such non-schedule cases; although not one case involving the
287 (3d Dep't 1937), leave to appeal denied 276 N. Y. 688 (1938) ; Schultz v. Buffalo
Dry Dock Co., 250 App. Div. 807, 294 N. Y. Supp. 386, 16 IND. BULL. 166, 204 SPzC.
BULL. 289 (3d Dep't 1937); Kallio v. Sachs, 251 App. Div. 759, 295 N. Y. Supp, 442,
16 IND. BULL. 207, 204 SpEc. BULL. 287 (3d Dep't 1937).
24N. Y. WoRx. Con. L. § 15 (3).2
rSee text and cases infra concerning unhealed lesions.26Brennan v. Mack International Motor Truck, 238 App. Div. 877, 263 N. Y. Supp.
1001 (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd 262 N. Y. 660, 188 N. E. 109 (1933). Italics added.
1944]
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painful or non-painful exceptions to the schedule provisions has referred to
that criterion or cited the case establishing it.
In Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 7 it was pointed out by the Court of Appeals
that the Legislature, when it established the schedule, had in mind the usual
and expected consequences resulting from the loss, or the loss of use, of a
member of the body. A person is restricted to the schedule compensation
only "in case the effect of the injury is the usual and expected effect." If he
suffers from a "serious, unusual and unexpected condition as a result of a
schedule injury, he is entitled to an award greater than that provided for
such schedule injury." If an "unusual and extraordinary condition develops
as a result of the injury" an award is to be made "for the actual, although
unusual and unexpected condition," despite the fact that the original injury
was covered by the schedule.
The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between the usual results of in-
juries and those consequences which are "natural and unavoidable" in par-
ticular cases. For example, death or blood poisoning is not the usual result
of an injury to the foot, although in the case of certain individuals with pre-
existing infirmities, either may be the natural and unavoidable consequence.
Increased awards 28 are to be made if the sequelae are unusual even though
such sequelae be natural and unavoidable. 29
No limitation is placed upon the type of effects which excludes a case from
the schedule group. "The determination depends upon the facts in each
-case."30 Pain which affects earning capacity has been held to be a conse-
quence which removes a case from the schedule provisions.3 ' In other cases,
other consequences will have the same result.
Words such as "usual," "expected," "unusual" and "extraordinary" are
simple on their face. The practitioner before the State Industrial Board may
well wonder whether the claimant he represents suffers from "usual" or
'iunusual" results of a schedule injury. As the Court of Appeals has said:
"The determination depends upon the facts in each. case."'32
27253 N. Y. 108, 110, 111, 170 N. E. 511, 512 (1930). Italics added.281n speaking of increased a.vards, the court was not referring to a schedule "award
plus an additional award. See cases cited notes 20, 21 supra, and the text pertaining
thereto. The court probably had in mind awards for death benefits or for reduced
earning capacity, which may extend beyond the schedule periods. Matter of Sokolowski
v. Bank of America, 261 N. Y. 57, 62, 184 N. E. 492, 494 (1933) ; Matter of Carolan
v. Hoe & Co., 225 App. Div. 393, 396, 233 N. Y. Supp. 333, 336 (3d Dep't 1939).29Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 170 N. E. 511 (1930).
3Od. at 111, 170 N. E. at 511, 512.
31See cases cited note 23 supra.32Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 170 N. E. 511 (1930).
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III. OTHER CRITERIA
New York is not the only state which uses the usual results test. In fact,
it may be stated as the general rule that if effects are ,usual, claimants
will be limited to schedule compensation. 3 It is a prerequisite to the making
of non-schedule awards that the results of injuries to specific limbs be extra-
ordinary and unusual.
True, states use varying phraseology to describe their criteria for non-
schedule compensation. But embedded in the language of most state courts is
the requirement of unexpected effects.3 4 It is said to be the intent of the
legislature that the schedule compensate for the "common and recognized
result," for what "commonly and usually follows," 3 5 and for the "normal
and immediate incidents"' 0 of injuries to specific members.
Some states adhere to the same rule as New York.37 Others require the
satisfaction of not only the usual results test but also of additional criteria
as a prerequisite to non-schedule awards; In some states, the additional test
is whether the injuries affect another portion of the claimant's body. 8
Several states, for a supplemental criterion, require that the injuries involve,
in-the alternative, other portions of the body or the general health of the
claimant.8 9
33Ottens v. Western Contracting Co., 296 N. W. 431 (Neb. 1941) (this case cites
Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 170 N. E. 511-(1930), the leading New
York case which establishes the "usual results" test) ; Kajundzich v. State Industrial
Accident Commission, 164 Ore. 510, 102 P. (2d) 924 (1940) (this case also cites
Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 170 N. E. 511 (1930) ; Spring Canyon
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 553, 210 Pac. 611 (1922) ; Morgan v.
Adams, 127,Conn. 294, 16 A. (2d) 576 (1940); Amos v. J. E. Trigg Drilling .Co., 153
Kan. 617, 113 P. (2d) 107 (1941) ; Bommarito v. Fisher Body Corporation, 273 Mich.
1, 262 N. W. 329 (1935); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Lemons, 33 S. W. (2d) 251
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Lente v. Lucci, 275 Pa. 217, 119 AtI. 132 (1922); Sigley v.
Marathon Razor Blade,, 111 N. J. L. 25, 166 Atl. 518 (1933) ; Ketchikan Lumber &
Shingle Co. v. Walker, 15 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) (involving Alaska Work-
men's Compensation Act).34See cases cited note 33 supra.35Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Lemons, 33 S. W. (2d) 251, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930) ; Jasper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 119 S. W. (2d) 386, 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
36Saddlemire v. American Bridge Co., 94 Conn. 618, 628, 110 Atl. 63, 68 (1920) ; Bom-
marito v. Fisher Body Corporation, 273 Mich. 1, 262 N. W. 329 (1935). See also Matter
of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 170 N. E. 511 (1930).
37Saddlemire v. American Bridge Co., 94 Conn. 618, 628, 110 Atl. 63, 68 (1920);
Spring ,Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 553, 210 Pac. 611 (1922) ;
Amos v. J. E. Trigg Drilling Co., 153 Kan. 617, 113 P. (2d) 107 (1941) .
38 Lente v. Lucci, 275 Pa. 217, 119 Atl. 132 (1922) ; Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Reid, 178
Ga. 399, 173 S. E. 376 (1934) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith, 44 Ga. App. 840, 163
S. E. 247 (1932); Elk City Cotton Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 184 Okla.
503, 88 P. (2d) 615 (1939).89Kajundzich v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 164 Ore. 510, 102 P. (2d) 924
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A few states prescribe a criterion supplemental to the "usual results,"
the "general health" or "other portions of the body" t~sts. They say that
the disability must extend beyond the schedule period. 40 This idea has been
expressed in an appellate division decision in New York.41 Others require a
prolonged isability, without defining the length of disability in terms of its
exceeding the schedule periods.42 However, it is probable that these courts
also mean incapacity in excess of the schedule number of weeks.
Implied in all the criteria is the requisite of an unusual disability continu-
ing for an unusually long time. Some states, as stated above, voice the view
that there must be prolonged disability. The others apparently assume this
requirement witlout expressing it other than to prescribe that the disability
be permanent.
The length of disability is very important. It may be the period of dis-'
ability rather than the particular sequela of the injury which makes the disa-
bility unusual. Thus it may be normal for a claimant to suffer pain after an
injury, although it is abnormal for the pain to be permanent.43
Decisions of states which supplement the usual results test by other
standards are significant. These states grant only schedule compensation for
normal effects since it is agreed that the schedule covers usial results. 44 The
additional standards of such states are utilized to point out cases which legis-
latures did not intend to include in the schedules. It may be stated, conse-
quently, that the additional criteria indicate the characteristics of unusual re-
sults. Thus, if injuries affect other portions of the body or the general
health of a claimant so as to cause prolonged disability, such results are
extraordinary, and such cases merit non-schedule compensation. 45
All things being'equal, human bodies react similarly to injuries. There-
fore, an extraordinary consequence of an injury in one part of the United
(1940) ; bttens v. Western Contracting Co., 296 N. W. 431 '(Neb. 1941) ; Greseck v.
Farmers Union Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 755, 243 N. W. 898 (1932); Petroleum
Casualty Co. v. Seale, 13 S. W. (2d) 264 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929); Federal Under-
writers Exchange v. Simpson, 137 S. W. (2d) 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).4 0Lente v. Lucci, 275 Pa. 217, 119 Atl. 132 (1922); Bommarito v. Fisher Body
Corporation, 273 Mich. 1, 262 Nj W. 329 (1935); Matter of Cai-olan v. Hoe & Co.,
225 App. Div. 393, 233 N. Y. Supp. 333 (3d Dep't 1939).4 1Matter of Carolan v. Hoe & Co., 225 App. 393, 233 N. Y. Supp. 333 (3d Dep't 1939).4 2 Spring Canyon Coal C6. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 553, 210 Pac. 611
(1922); Firemen's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Hopkins, 119 S. W. (2d) 394 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).4 3Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Hevolow, 136 S. W. (2d) 931, 933 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940).4 4 See cases cited notes 33, 35, and 36 supra.4 5 See cases cited notes 38 and 39 supra.
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States will ordinarily be regarded in the same light in another portion of the
country. Hence, it may be concluded that the criteria employed by states
other than New York for the determination of abnormal results should also
have valid application in New York. Such criteria indicate the types of
sequelae which New York courts will probably deem unusual.
It is noteworthy for the New York courts that Oregon and Nebraska
which have espoused the usual results test, citing with approval Matter of
Dowling v. Gates,46 the leading New York case on that subject, have sup-
plemented this test with the requirement, for non-schedule awards, that the
extraordinary conditions involve other portions of the claimant's body or
his general health.47 This shows a trend towards defining what are unusual
results in addition to establishing the rule that they are necessary for non-
schedule compensation.
The supplemental criteria already discussed are not the sole ones which
may and have been utilized to judge the normality of effects.
In Indiana 48 a principle has been evolved which the writer for convenience
calls the "unhealed lesion" test. In one case, 49 an abrasion of the left leg had
resulted in inflammation of the veins, varicose veins and ulcers. The leg was so
painful that the claimant was wholly unable to perform his usual work. The
court, refusing to modify an award for total disability, said:
... at no time since the injury have his injuries healed or attained a
permanent or quiescent state so that his injury has been confined to any
degree of permanent impairment.
Claimants with such conditions are entitled tQ be paid continuously as long as
the conditions persist. 0
In the unhealed lesion cases, schedule awards may be deemed impractical
because a tribunal is unable to estimate the extent of loss of function.
Temporary healing may reduce the percentage of loss on certain days,
whereas on other days the percentage of loss is higher. On particular days,
moreover, the pain may be less disabling than on other days.
Unhealed lesions necessitate a limitation of activities to an extent which
46253 N. Y. 108, 170 N. E. 511 (1930).
4 7 Ottens v. Western Contracting Co., 296 N. W. 431 (Neb. 1941); Gregeck v. Farm-
ers Union Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 755, 243 N. W. 898 (1932) ; Kajundzich v. State
Industrial, Accident Commission, 164 Ore. 510, 102 P. (2d) 924 (1940).
48Swift & Co. v. Bobich, 88 Ind. App. 64, 163 N. E. 232 (1928) ; Inman v. Carl Furst
Co., 92 Ind. App. 17, 174 N. E. 96 (1930).
49Swift & Co. v. Bobich, 88 Ind. App. 64, 163 N. E. 232 (1928).5GInman v. Carl Furst Co., 92 Ind. App. 17, 174 N. E. 96 (1930).
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is greater than the degree of limitation ordinarily following mere loss of
function. There is constant need for medical attention.5 1
It may be concluded that unhealed lesions cause unusual disabilities for
prolonged periods, and that they should rightly be classified as unusual
results of injuries, justifying non-schedule compensation.
Another criterion, previously mentioned, is pain, affecting earning capacity.
This standard seems to be a more specific restatement of the requirement
that the conditions involve other portions of the body or the general health
of a claimant. Pain in one part of the body may cause the whole body to
suffer.52 It may affect the mind, leaving the individual depressed and unable
to concentrate. It may result in a restriction of the movements of the body
in an effort to avoid pain. Valuable time is spent in palliative measures.
Moreover, it is impracticable to estimate the extent of loss of function where
the condition is painful. 53 Although pain and loss of function may be
permanent, it is infeasible to measure the loss. As in unhealed lesion cases,
the pain on certain days will be less disabling than on others.
It is clear that all pain will in some way influence an individual's capacity
to work. Therefore, "pain" and "pain affecting earning capacity" are prac-
tically synonymous.
The New York courts have ruled that pain affecting earning capacity
removes a case from the schedule class.54 They have, in effect, decided that
pain is an unusual consequence of an injury. This finding seems justified in
view of the effects of pain on an individual as a working unit. There is
unusual "additional" 55 disability for a prolonged period of time.
The following criteria, then, seem pertinent to an inquiry as to whether the
results of an injury are usual: (a) their effect on other portions of the body;
(b) their effect on general health; (c) whether there are unhealed lesions;
and (d) whether there is pain effecting earning capacity. These factors are,
of course, important only if the disability is unusually prolonged.
These criteria cannot be dearly differentiated. Unhealed lesions and pain
5Cf. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Anders, 292 S. W. 265, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927).
52Maryland Casualty Co. v. Donnelly, 50 S. W. (2d) 388, 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932);
Oilmen's Reciprocal Asg'n v. Youngblood, 297 S. W. 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Se-
curity Union Casualty Co. v. Frederick, 295 S. W. 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Plum
v. Hotel Washington, 125 Pa. Super. 280, 189 At. 792 (1937).
-
3This argument was made by the Attorney General of New York State in Franich
v. N. Y. Trap Rock Corp., 242 App. Div. 744, 13 IND. BULL. 250 (3d Dep't 1934).
-
5 4See cases cited note 23 mtpra.55Brennan v. Mack International Motor Truck, 238 App. Div. 877, 263 N. Y. Supp. 1001(3d Dep't 1933), aff'd 262 N. Y. 600, 188 N. E. 109 (1933) ; see text supra p. 223.
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may affect other portions of the body and the general health. One might
justifiably consider unhealed lesions and pain as subdivisions of the more
general criteria: "effects on other parts of the body and on the general
health. '5
6
The latter standards need further definition. Not any effect on other por-
tions of the body or on the general health is sufficient to warrant non-
schedule awards. Many schedule injuries normally affect other parts of the
body. For example, a shortened leg may cause a muscle strain on the un-
injured side. Yet, such a result is usual and will not merit non-schedule
compensation."
It appears that only unusual effects on other portions of the body, or on
the general health, will be regarded as the basis for awards for reduced
earning capacity. Such conditions as unhealed lesions and pain affecting
earning capacity will probably be considered as unusual effects. Other conse-
quences may be unusual, but their characteristics are not precisely delineated.
Courts, in deciding whether results are uncommon, will look for unusual
disabilities resulting from an injury to a limb.58 If an extraordinary perma-
nent disability is evident, non-schedule compensation is likely to be granted.
"The law intends that an employee who is entitled to compensation shall re-
ceive compensation for all the disability he suffers from the accidental
ipjury."59 Schedules provide compensation only for usual disability. For
permanent disability in excess of usual disability, the courts, to compensate
claimants fully, tend to resort to non-schedule awards.
IV. USUAL AND UNUSUAL RESULTS OF INJURY
In concentrating upon the unusual effects of injuries, one may lose sight of
the innumerable cases in which the results are normal. The following state-
ment of the Supreme Court of Kansas is noteworthy:
Fundamentally almost any scheduled injury under our Workmen's
Compensation Law produces some-perhaps slight although it may be
substantial-unnatural results upon normal bodily functions. If it were
held that all such results constituted general partial disability under the
statute, there would be little or no purpose in having scheduled injuries.60
56For cases relating to pain which causes the whole body to suffer, see note 52 supra.57See Cornell v. Cities Service Gas Co., 138 Kan. 607, 27 P. (2d) 228 (1933).58Brennan v. Mack International Motor Truck, 238 App. Div. 877, 263 N. Y. Supp.
1001 (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd 262 N. Y. 660, 188 N. E. 109 (1933).59Matter of Carolan v. Hoe & Co., 225 App. Div. 393, 233 N. Y. Supp. 333 (3d Dep't
1939).0 Cornell v. Cities Service Gas Co., 138 Kan. 607, 609, 27 P. (2d) 228 (1933). The
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Th6 following is an analysis of cases of injuries to specific members of the
body with respect to the consequences and the accompanying compensation
awards :61
A. Usual Results
When fractured bones heal, residual deformities and limitations of motion
are frequent. For such ,common results, scheduled compensation will be con-
sidered complete and adequate.0 2 Even the need for crutches or a cane is a
"normal result" for which schedule awards fully compensate. 63
Atrophy of the uninjured portion of a limb due to disuse after amputation
of or injury to another part of the limb is regarded as a usual effect.64 Thus
where a foot was amputated, the atrophy in the remainder of the leg because
of disuse was held to be covered by the schedule award.65
For injuries to a specific limb causing anaesthesia of the limb, only a
schedule award was granted.6 A similar view was taken as to injuries to a
limb causing'a: paralysis of that limb.67
quotation is repeated in Barry v. Peterson Motor Co., 55 Idaho 702, 706, 46 P. (2d) 77(1935).
61For general references relating to the medical conditions considered in the study, see:
BRAHDY AND KAHN, TRAUMA AND DISEASE (1937); CAMPBELL, A TEXT-BOOK ON
ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY (1930); CECIL, TEXTBOOK OF MFDIcINE (5th ed. 1940); GRAY,
ATTORNEYS TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE (2d ed. 1940); KESSLER, ACCIDENTAL INJUBIES(1931); MEAXiNS, THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE (3d ed. 1940).
62Cornell v. Cities Service Gas Co., 138 Kan. 607, 27 P. (2d) 228 (1933) ; Sharcheck
v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 275 Pa. 225, 119 Atl. 135 (1922); Inman v. Carl Furst Co.,
92 Ind. App. 17, 174 N. E. 96 (1930).
63Sharcheck v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 275 Pa. 225, 228, 119 Atl. 135, 136 (1922). See
also Inman v. Carl Furst Co., 92 Ind. App. 17, 174 N. E. 96 (1930).
64Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 111, 170 N. E. 511, 512, (1930);
Stein v. Topol, 217 App. Div. 797, 216 N. Y. Supp. 720 (3d Dep't 1926); Matter of
Roular v. Henry Forge and Tool Company, 232 App. Div. 857, 249 N. Y. Supp. 17
(3d Dep't 1931) ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Harden, 44 Ga. App. 223, 160
S. E. 699 (1931).
65Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 111, 170 N. E. 511, 512 (1930);
Stein v. Topol, 217 App. Div. 797, 216 N. Y. Supp. 720 (3d Dep't 1926) ; Ocean Acci-
dent & Guarantee Corp. v. Harden, 44 Ga. App. 223, 160 S. E. 699 (1931) (injury to
heel bone).
COGruttaduria v. Imperial Metal Mfg. Co., 250 App. Div. 242, 294 N. Y. Supp. 451,
16 IND. BULL. 125, 204 SPEC. BULL. 288 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Matter of Nycz v. Buffalo
Body Corporation, 221 App. Div. 620, 224 N. Y. Supp. 734, 7 InD. BULL. 65 (3d Dep't
1927); Kajundzich v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 164 Ore. 510, 102 P. (2d)
924 (1940).
67Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Brown, 174 'Okla. 191, 50 P. (2d) 165 (1935).
See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith, 44 Ga. App. 840, 163 S. E. 247 (1932). In Matter
of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 111, 170 N. E. 511, 512 (1930), paralysis is
stated to be an unusiial result. The New York Court of Appeals said: "The amputation
of a foot may result in blood poisoning, paralysis or death. They are not the usual re-
sults of the injury and operation. . . ." In view of the other conditions, i.e. blood poison-
ing or death, it appears that the word paralysis, as used by the court, connotes paralysis
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B. Unusual Results
(1) Pain Affecting Earning Capacity
This criterion has been clearly established as a basis for reduced earnings
awards. 68 It is relevant and applicable to the following, among other, pain-
ful effects of injuries:
(a) Arthritis.-Arthritis has been defined as the "inflammation of a
joint."6' 9 The cases have held uniformly that a painful traumatic arthritis of
the knee or leg merits an award for reduced earning capacity.
70
(b) Neuritis and Nerve Injuries.-Neuritis is an "Inflammation of a
nerve. The condition is attended by pain and tenderness over the nerves,
anesthesia, disturbances of sensation, ,paralysis, wasting, and disappearance of
the reflexes."71 Non-schedule awards, for painful residual disabilities caused
by neuritis and nerve injuries are common.7 2
(c) Phlebitis.-Phlebitis is an "Inflammation of a vein. The condition is
marked by infiltration of the coats of the vein and the formation of a throm-
bus of coagulated blood. The disease'is attended by edema, stiffness, and
pain in the affected portion. '73 Phlebitis is a ground for an award for re-
duced earning capacity.7 4
of a goodly portion of the body and not just paralysis of a limb. The writer believes
that paralysis confined to a limb would be considered covered by, a schedule award.68 See cases cited note 23 supra.
09DORLAND, THE AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (17th ed. 1935) 151.7 OKallio v. Sachs, 251 App. Div. 759, 295 N. Y. Supp. 442, 161 IND. BULL. 207, 204
SPEC. BULL. 287 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Brennan v. Mack International Motor Truck, 238
App. Div. 877, 263 N. Y. Supp. 1001 (3d Dep't 1933) aff'd 262 N. Y. 660, 188, N. E.
109 (1933) (painful progressive arthritis commencing in the left knee) ; Plum v.
Hotel Washington, 125 Pa. Super. 280, 189 Atl. 792 (1937) (knee); cf. Crowninshield
v. Buck Productions, Inc., 243 App. Div. 662, 14 IND. BULL. 26 (3d Dep't 1935).71 DORLAND, op. cit. supra note 69, at 908.72 Security Union Casualty Co. v. Frederick, 295 S. W. 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
(total disability due to traumatic neuritis Iresulting from an injury to a leg) ; Simpson
v. New Jersey Stone and Tile Co., 93 N. J. L. 250, 107 Atl. 36 (1919) (total disability
-neuritis plus abscesses in arm); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Nunley, 82 S. W.
(2d) 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (total disability-injury to foot resulted in exposed
nerve ends and other effects) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bulgier, 19 S. W. (2d) 821 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929) (total disability-fractures of the arm caused impinged nerves affect-
ing the shoulders, back and spine); Nebraska National Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb.
432, 199 N. W. 557 (1924) (total disability-fractures of neck of femur causing mis-
placement of hip bone with resulting irritation of nerves, and affecting the entire
physical and nervous system).73 DORLAND, op. cit. smpra note 69 at 1404, 1405.
74 Schultz v. Buffalo Dry Dock Co., 250 App. Div. 807, 294 N. Y. Supp. 386, 16 IND.
BULL. 166, 204 SPEC. BULL. 289 (3d Dep't 1937) (phlebitis and infected ulcers in leg) ;
Saddlemire v. American Bridge Co., 250 App. Div. 807, 294 N. Y. Supp. 386, 16 IND.
BULL. 166, 204 SPEC. BULL. 289 (3d Dep't 1937) (phlebitis in leg) ; Morgan v. Adams,
94 Conn. 618, 628, 110 Ati. 63, 68 (1920) ; Amos v. J. E. Trigg Drilling Co., 153 Kan.
1944]
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(d) Synovitis.-Synovitis is an "inflammation of a synovial membrane"75
which is the lining of a joint cavity such as the knee.76 The function of the
synovial membrane is to secrete the synovia which is a "viscid lubricating
fluid. ' ' 77 Synovitis "is usually painful, particularly on motion .... 78 Im-
paired earnings awards have been granted for a painful chronic synovitis of
the knee.79
(e) Ununited Fractures.--Frequently, ununited 'fractures of the legs cause
total disability. 0 Ununited fractures are usually painful and are a valid
basis for non-schedule awards. 81
(2) Unhealed Lesions
Unhealed lesions are unusual consequences of injuries, causing unexpected
disabilities. The "unhealed lesion" criterion is relevant and applicable to the
following, among other, conditions:
(a) Osteomyelitis.-Osteomyelitis is defined as an "inflammation of the
bone marrow, or of the bone and marrow; inflammation of the medullary
cavity of a bone.8 2 It is an infection requiring drainage.8 3  Pus is dis-
charged through sinuses (channels) in the skin.8 4 In chronic osteomyelitis,
"one or more sinuses at various points continue to drain; on palpation
there is swelling . . . of the soft tissues, hypertrophy (morbid enlarge-
ment or overgrowth) of the bone, and the affected area is tender to pres-
sure. Unless deformity has been prevented, the adjacent joints may be con-
617, 113 P. (2d) 107 (1941); Swift & Co. v. Bobich, 88 Ind. App. 64, 16 N. E. 232
(1928) ; Sigley v. Marathon Razor Blade, 111 N. J. L. 25, 160 Atl. 518 (1933);
Bommarito v. Fisher Body Corporation, 273 Mich. 1, 262 N. W. 329 (1935).7 5 DORLAND, op. cit. supra note 69, at 1337.7 6 CAfPBELL, op. cit. supra note 61, at 143.7 7 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1935) 2560.
7 8DORLAND, op. cit. supra note.69, at 1337.
79Kallio v. Sachs, 251 App. Div. 759, 295 N. Y.. Supp. 442, 161 IND. BULL. 207, 204
SPEC. BuLL. 287 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Mestler v. American Book Sales Co., 248 App. Div.
647, 287 N. Y. Supp. 512 (3d Dep't 1936) ; cf. Crowninshield v. Buck Productions, Inc.,
243 App. Div. 662, 14 INn, BULL. 26 (3d Dep't 1935).8 0Carr v. Lewiston Union School, 241 App. Div. 642, 13 IND. BULL. 26 (3d Dep't
1934) ; Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, 161 Tenn. 470, 33 S. W. (2d) 90 (1930) ; Lumber-
men's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Anders, 292 S. W. 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).81Coates v. Warren Hotel, 18 N. J. Misc. 122, 11 A. (2d) 436 (1940); Gorman v.
Miner-Edgar Chemical Corp., 9 N. J. Misc. 180, 153 Atl. 271 (1931), modified 123
N. 3. L. 235, 8 A. (2d) 574 (1939); cf. McCarty v. U. S. Trucking Corp., 255 App.
Div. 741,, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 939 (3d Dep't 1938), aff'd 281 N. Y. 704, 23 N. E. (2d) 538
(1939).82 DORLAND, op. cit. supra note 69, at 965.
83GRAy, op. cit. supra note 61, at 554, 559; BRA11DY AND KAHN, op. cit. supra note 61,
at 367.
84CAM BELL, op. cit. supra note 61, at 449, 450.
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tracted in malposition."8 5 The temperature may remain slightly elevated.8 6
The claimant may have chills and headaches.8
Osteomyelitis may be classified as an unhealed lesion. It requires con-
tinual medical care.8 8 Disability ensues by reason of draining sinuses and
bone overgrowth, although frequently, in the chronic stage, pain is unim-
portant. Osteomyelitis affects the general health, producing fever, toxemia,
anemia, loss of weight and other conditions.8 9 During flair-ups pain may be
acuteY
0
In Huber v. Cutler Hammer Mfg. Co.,9' the claimant had a chronic
osteomyelitis of the tibia in a leg and an open ulcer on the leg. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department, reversed
an award for reduced earning capacity on the ground that the injury was
confined to the claimant's leg and that therefore a schedule award should
have been made.
This case seems to have been overruled in effect by the later cases of
Anderson ,r. International Motor Co. 92 and Matter of Cartenuto v. McConnell
& Co. Inc.9 3 wherein osteomyelitic conditions in the leg and foot, respectively,
were deemed to be the basis for non-schedule awards. In Matter of Mestler
v. American Book Sales Co.,94 an award was made for reduced earning capacity
due to a synovitis of the knee. The New York Court of Appeals, in affirming
that case, did not heed the dissent in the appellate division. The dissent had
cited the Huber case in support of the position that a schedule award should
have been made. It may be said that the Huber case is no longer good law.
Some decisions have stated specifically that osteomyelitis is an abnormal,
851d. at 452.
8GIbid.
87Anderson v. International Motor Co., 244 App. Div. 853, 279 N. Y. Supp. 534, 14
IND. BULL. 171 (3d Dep't 1935).
88Ibid. (osteomyelitis of the tibia of the leg with an open sinus, requiring almost
daily treatment) ; Matter of Cartenuto v. McConnell & Co., Inc., 254 App. Div. 612, 2 N.
Y. S. (2d) 841 (3d Dep't 1938) (wherein claimant was confined to his bed).89Anderson v. International Motor Co., 244 App. Div. 853, 279 N. Y. Supp. 534,
14 IND. BULL. 171 (3d Dep't 1935) ; Johnson v. Purnell, 131 -a. Super. 230, 200 Ati.
151 (1938) ; Russell v. Virginia Bridge'& Iron Co., 172 Tenn. 268, 111 S. W. (2d)
1027 (1938) ; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 553, 210 Pac.
611 (1922) ; CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 61, at 452.9ORussell v. Virginia Bridge & Iron Co., 172 Tenn. 268, 111 S. W. (2d) 1027 (1938);
Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Anders, 292 S. W. 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
91243 App. Div. 646, 276 N. Y. 'Supp. 496, 14 IND. BULL. 28 (3d Dep't 1935).
92244 App. Div. 853, 279 N. Y. Supp. 534 (3d Dep't 1935).
93254 App. Div. 612, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 841 (3d Dep't 1938) ; see cases cited notes 4
and 88 supra.
94248 App. Div. 646, 287 N. Y. Supp. 512 (3d Dep't 1936), aff'd 272 N. Y. 544, 4
N. E. (2d) 728 (1936).
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unexpected condition. 95 Other cases have held that it affects "other portions
of the body."96
It may be concluded that claimants with chronic osteomyelitis will generally
receive non-schedule awards.
(b) Ulcers.-An ulcer is "an open sore other than a wound; a loss of
substance on a cutaneous or mucous surface, causing gradual disintegration
and necrosis (death of a circumscribed portion) of the tissues."9 7  The
failure of chronic ulcers to heal is commonly'due to underlying circulatory
pathologies in the veins and arteries, such as varicose veins and arteriosclero-
sis. 98 Medical supervision is necessary to prevent infection and to promote
healing.
It has been indicated above that the case of Huber v. Cutler Hammer Mfg.
Co.,99 wherein a claimant with an open ulcer and chronic osteomyelitis was
restricted to a schedule award, has been impliedly overruled. This trend is
made even clearer by Schdta v. Buffalo Dry Dock Co.,100 a later case, which
relates to a claimant suffering from infected ulcers and a phlebitis of the leg
with marked swelling below the knee. Therein, an award for reduced earning
capacity was affirmed.
Ulcers are unhealed lesions' 01 which affect the remainder of the body and
cause unexpected disability. Non-schedule awards will ordinarily be granted
'where injuries result in chronic ulcers.'0 2
-
9 5 Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 553, 210 Pac. 611
(1922) ; Johnson v. Purnell, 131 Pa. Super. 230, 200 Atl. 151 (1938). But see Shar-
check v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 275 Pa. 225, 119 Ati. 135 (1922). In that case, the
claimant who had restricted motion of the ankle and a healed osteomyelitis of the tibia
was limited to a schedule award.
It is significant that the Pennsylvania courts under their interpretation of the Penn-
sylvania workmen's compensation statutes do not permit any recovery over and above
the schedule for "pain, annoyance, inconveniences, disability to work or anything that
may come under the term 'all disability,' or normally resulting from permanent in-
jury." Lente v. Lucci, 275 Pa. 217, 222, 119 Atl. 132, 134 (1922).
19 6 Johnson v. Purnell, 131 Pa. Super. 230, 200 Atl. 151 (1938) ; Russell v. Virginia
Bridge & Iron Co., 172 Tenn. 268, 111 S. W. (2d) 1027 (1938).
? 7DORLAND, op. cit. supra note 69, at 1460, 891 (see definitions of ulcer and necrosis
therein).
9 8 KEssLmR, op. cit. supra note 61, at 65; BRANDY AND KAHN, op. Cit. supra note 61,
at 100, 101; GRAY, of". cit. supra note 61, at 896, 887.
99243 App. Div. 646, 276 N. Y. Supp. 496 (3d Dep't 1935).
100250 App. Div. 807, 294 N. Y. Supp. 386 (3d Dep't 1937).
10 1 Swift v. Bobich, 88 Ind. App. 64, 163 N. E. 232 (1928).
10 2Von Lehn v. Von Lehn Sons, 31 N. Y. St. Dep't Rep. 538 (1924) (decision of
the Industrial Board making an award for reduced earning capacity due to incurable
gangrenous ulcers on the claimant's leg); Swift v. Bobich, 88 Ind. App. 64, 163 N. E.
232 (1928) (total disability found).
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(3) Injuries Affecting Other Portions qf the Body or General Health
It has been pointed out that pain and unhealed lesions affect other portions
of the body and the general health. However, in some instances, even in the
absence of pain or unhealed lesions, the injuries affect other parts of the body
or the general health. Thus an injury may cause blood poisoning, 03 paralysis
in another part,10 4 nervous disorders,105 insanity'0 6 or even death.10 7 These
are not the usual results of injuries. 0 8 In such cases, there is agreement
that non-schedule awards are proper.10 9
V. CONCLUSION
Under the usual results test, the New York Industrial Board is vested with
a great degree of discretion. Each case is determined on its own facts.
Actually, in practice, the Industrial Board and the courts seem to adhere
to the test, although they fail to express their adherence. Mention is made
only of such factors as pain affecting earning capacity and "additional" disa-
bility. These factors are but guides to what are unusual results and should
be recognized as such.
It is in the best interests of the public and the bar that the usual results
criterion be more specifically defined in terms such as pain, failure to heal,
effect on the general health, etc. The ,ability to predict schedule or non-
schedule awards in cases of permanent, partial disability will then be general,
instead of confined almost wholly to veteran workmen's compensation prac-
titioners, who know through experience what is unexpressed in decisions.
'
0 3Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 111, 170 N. E. 511, 512 (1930)
Morgan v. Adams, 127 Conn. 294, 296, 16 A. (2d) 576 (1940); Georgia Casualty Co.
v. Jones, 156 Ga. 664, 667, 119 S. E. 721 (1923); Sigley v. .vfarathon Razor Blade,
111 N. J. L. 25, 30, 166 Atl. 518, 520 (1930) ; Greseck v. Farmer's Union Elevator
Co., 123 Neb. 755, 759, 243 N. W. 898, 900 (1932); Amos v. J. E. Trigg Drilling Co.,
153 Kan. 617, 620, 113 P. (2d) 107, 109 (1941).10 4 Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 111, 170 N. E. 511, 512 (1930)
Georgia Casualty Co. v. Jones, 156 Ga. 664, 667, 119 S. E. 721 (1923); Greseck v.
Farmer's Union Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 755, 759, 243 N. W. 898, 900 (1932); Bommarito
v. Fisher Body Corporation, 273 Mich. 1, 3, 4, 262 N. W. 329, 330 (1935).
'
0 5 Morgan v. Adams, 127 Conn. 294, 296, 16 A. (2d) 576, 577 (1940); Sigley v.
Marathon Razor Blade, 111 N. J. L. 25, 166 Atl. 518 (1933); Amos v. J. E. Trigg
Drilling Co., 153 Kan. 617, 620, 113 P. (2d) 107, 109 (1941).
'OMatter of Rothwell v. Shipley Construction & Supply Co., 244 N. Y. 558, 155
N. E. 896 (1927) ; Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 170 N. E. 511 (1930);
Gardner v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 122 Pa. Super. 592, 186 Atl. 410 (1935).
107 Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 111, 170 N. E. 511, 512 (1930).0 8 Matter of Dowling v. Gates, 253 N. Y. 108, 110, 111, 170 N. E. 511, 512 (1930)
cases cited notes 103 through 107 supra.
'
0
oSee cases cited notes 103 through 108 supra.
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